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Abstract 1 
We investigated whether chimpanzees can use self-experience to infer what another 2 
sees in two studies. Subjects first gained self-experience with the visual properties of 3 
an object (either opaque or see-through). In a subsequent test phase, a human 4 
experimenter interacted with the object and we tested whether chimpanzees 5 
understood that the experimenter experienced the object as opaque or as see-through. 6 
Crucially, in the test phase, the object seemed opaque to the subject in all cases (while 7 
the experimenter could see through the one that they had experienced as see-through 8 
before), such that she had to use her previous self-experience with the object to 9 
correctly infer whether the experimenter could or could not see when looking at the 10 
object. Chimpanzees did not attribute their previous self-experience with the object to 11 
the experimenter in a gaze-following task (experiment 1); however, they did so 12 
successfully in a competitive context (experiment 2). We conclude that chimpanzees 13 
successfully used their self-experience to infer what the competitor sees. We discuss 14 
our results in relation to the well-known ‘goggles experiment’ and address alternative 15 
explanations. 16 
 17 
Keywords: Chimpanzee, experience projection, perspective taking, social cognition, 18 
theory of mind  19 
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The goggles experiment: Can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a 20 
competitor can see? 21 
 22 
Mentalising, or possessing a “Theory of Mind”, refers to the ability to ascribe 23 
unobservable mental states to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff 1978). 24 
Whether this ability is uniquely human or shared with non-human primates is still 25 
highly controversial. Advocates of great apes’ mentalising capabilities can by now list 26 
an abundance of studies that support their view (for reviews, see Andrews 2005; Call 27 
2007; Call & Tomasello 2008; Whiten 2013). In contrast, skeptics are still not 28 
convinced and explain positive results by nonmentalistic processes, such as 29 
associative learning or inferences based on nonmentalistic categories (Heyes 1998; 30 
Penn & Povinelli 2007; Povinelli & Vonk 2004). Some theorists doubt that 31 
distinguishing reasoning about another’s mind from responding to behavioural cues 32 
alone will ever be possible, as inferences about another’s mental state are inevitably 33 
based on their behaviour (Lurz 2009; Purdy & Domjan 1998; Shettleworth 2010).  34 
Heyes (1998) proposed one way to distinguish mentalising skills from 35 
nonmentalistic processes. The design was later refined by Povinelli and Vonk (2003, 36 
2004) and became known as the “goggles experiment”. In this theoretical study, 37 
primate subjects first gain experience with two pairs of mirrored goggles in a training 38 
phase. From the outside, both goggles differ only in their rim colour. However, when 39 
wearing them, subjects experience one as opaque and the other as transparent. In the 40 
subsequent test phase, two experimenters wear the goggles such that one can see, 41 
while the other cannot. The subject is now allowed to beg for food from one of the 42 
experimenters. If primates are able to mentalise, they should use their own mental 43 
experience to infer the others’ mental states, and prefer begging from the 44 
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experimenter who wears the see-through goggles. Crucially, subjects never observe 45 
others interacting with the goggles, such that effects from observational learning can 46 
be excluded.  47 
Although well-known and perhaps the clearest way of demonstrating 48 
mentalism in a nonverbal animal, there have since been little attempts to implement 49 
the study. Penn and Povinelli report negative results for chimpanzees in a study in 50 
which they used (instead of goggles) buckets with opaque or see-through visors 51 
(Vonk & Povinelli 2011). In contrast, Meltzoff and Brooks (2008) conducted a study 52 
with 18-month-old infants that resembled the goggles experiment. They provided two 53 
groups of children different experience with the view-obstructing properties of 54 
blindfolds. Both blindfold types looked opaque from the outside, but through the 55 
“trick-blindfolds” one could see when close to one’s eyes, whereas the others were 56 
opaque and one could not see through them, even when close to one’s eyes. After this 57 
experience phase, the infants’ understanding of the other’s sight was tested in a gaze-58 
following task. A blindfolded experimenter sat opposite the child and looked to a 59 
target object to her left or right. The authors found that children who had experienced 60 
the opaque blindfolds followed the experimenter’s gaze less than those who had 61 
experienced the trick blindfolds. Infants thus used their self-experience to infer what a 62 
blindfolded experimenter could see. 63 
Like infants, chimpanzees follow conspecifics’ and humans’ gaze (e.g., 64 
Tomasello, Call & Hare 1998; Tomasello, Hare & Agnetta 1999). We thus decided to 65 
test chimpanzees’ mentalising abilities in an experiment similar to the infant study. 66 
Instead of blindfolds, we used “face masks” that could be held in front of the eyes of 67 
the subject (experience phase) or the experimenter (test phase). One mask was 68 
opaque, the other a trick mask that looked opaque from the outside, but could be seen 69 
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through when close to the eyes. In the test, a masked experimenter looked to a target 70 
object to her left or right, and we measured the subject’s gaze-following response. We 71 
hypothesised that if chimpanzees were able to use their own experience to infer what 72 
the other can see, they would follow the experimenter’s gaze less if they had 73 
experienced the opaque mask compared to the trick mask.  74 
In a second study, we used a competitive paradigm to test the same question – 75 
can chimpanzees use their self-experience to infer what the experimenter sees? 76 
Previous research has shown that chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive 77 
compared to cooperative contexts (Hare & Tomasello 2004). We thus hypothesised 78 
that it might be easier for chimpanzees to predict the other’s perspective in this 79 
paradigm.  80 
 81 
EXPERIMENT 1 82 
Methods 83 
Subjects 84 
Subjects were 25 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; 11 males, 14 females) living 85 
at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Lake Victoria, Uganda (mean age 86 
15.5±3.2 years, range 8-22 years) (www.ngambaisland.org). All apes came to the 87 
sanctuary as orphans as a result of the illegal bushmeat trade, were raised by humans 88 
together with peers, and at the time of testing lived in social groups. All of them had 89 
experience with experimental testing due to previous research at the sanctuary. 90 
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The subject was tested individually inside the holding facility. The 95 
experimenter sat opposite the subject, at a distance of about 60 cm. There was a 96 
rectangular black board on the floor (50x100 cm) between the experimenter and the 97 
subject (Fig. 1). Three cameras recorded the session. One was placed behind the 98 
experimenter and recorded her movements to keep track of the experimental 99 
conditions; the other two cameras were to the left and right of the experimenter, 135 100 
cm away from the subject, on a height of 150 cm, and provided a close-up of the 101 
subject’s face and upper body to keep track of her looking behaviour. Two identical, 102 
colourful plastic toys (25 cm high x15 cm wide) hung right underneath the cameras as 103 
potential gaze targets.  104 
We used four types of “face masks”, each shaped like a hand mirror (Fig. 2). 105 
A mask consisted of a yellow or blue frame (26 x 26 cm) on a handle bar (15 cm long, 106 
4 cm diameter) and an opaque or fly screen inner layer (21x21cm), resulting in the 107 
four different mask types opaque-yellow, opaque-blue, screen-yellow and screen-108 
blue. One could see through the fly screen when looking straight through, but not if 109 
looking from the side. The opaque and the screen layers looked the same when placed 110 
on a black surface (see Fig. 2). To maximise the similarity between both inner layer 111 
types, we added a layer of fly screen on top of the opaque layer, so that the surface 112 
structure was the same for both mask types. In the experience phase, we used 113 
colourful small toys (7x11 cm) and pieces of fruit to draw the animal’s attention to the 114 
mask. We did so by first showing the animal the object (toy or fruit) and subsequently 115 
positioning the mask between the subject’s eyes and the object, such that she would 116 
look at the mask. 117 
 118 
 119 
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 120 
Procedure and Design 121 
Each subject received two conditions in separate sessions on two consecutive 122 
days. We modeled our procedure as closely as possible to the infant study by Meltzoff 123 
and Brooks (2008). Each daily test session was split into two phases:  124 
Experience Phase. Subjects could gain experience with the properties of one 125 
mask type for eight minutes; on the next day, she would experience the other mask 126 
type. The experimenter sat down in front of the subject and placed pieces of fruit or 127 
colourful toys on the black board between them. When the subject fixated the object, 128 
the experimenter interposed the mask between the object and the subject’s eyes, such 129 
that the subject could learn about the mask’s properties (opaque/transparent, 130 
depending on condition). Subjects did not avoid looking at the mask and generally 131 
maintained their gaze direction after the mask was interposed, resulting in them 132 
looking at the mask. Multiple object exemplars in multiple spatial locations on the 133 
board were used to demonstrate that the screen mask did not block vision, and that the 134 
opaque one did. At the beginning of the experience phase, the experimenter held the 135 
mask close to the object, approximately 40 cm from the subject’s eyes. In the course 136 
of the eight minutes, she decreased the distance between the mask and the subject’s 137 
eyes up to a distance of about 10 cm. Even when the mask was close to the 138 
chimpanzees’ eyes, they sat still and maintained their general gaze direction, thus not 139 
showing signs of an avoidance reaction to the mask.  140 
Test Phase. After the experience phase, we tested the chimpanzee’s 141 
understanding of the effect of the experienced mask type on the experimenter’s sight 142 
in a gaze-following task. First, the experimenter started an electronic device that gave 143 
an acoustic signal every second to keep track of the time. At the beginning of each 144 
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trial, the experimenter approached first the right, then the left camera and examined 145 
the plastic toys to draw the subject’s attention to them. She then sat down opposite the 146 
chimpanzee and fed her, with the mask lying on the black board in front of her. After 147 
about one minute, she picked up the mask, held it close to her face, turned her masked 148 
face (and head) 90 degrees towards the left or right camera (according to a predefined 149 
scheme, never to the same side more than twice in a row, and left and right side 150 
counterbalanced), and remained with her face aligned with the camera for 7 seconds. 151 
Next, she laid down the mask and fed one to three more pieces of food to the subject 152 
before the next trial started. Crucially, in the test phase, the opaque inner layer was 153 
always inserted in the mask, such that in both conditions the mask really was opaque 154 
(and the experimenter was just starring at the inside of the mask, but her gaze 155 
direction aligned with the camera). We administered 8 test trials per session, with a 3-156 
minute repetition of the experience phase after the first 4 trials to remind the subjects 157 
of the mask properties.  158 
Each subject received each of the two conditions in separate sessions on two 159 
consecutive days. Twelve of the subjects started with the opaque condition, the other 160 
13 started with the screen condition. In each of the two condition groups, half of the 161 
subjects started with a yellow frame, the other half with a blue frame. In their 162 
following session, they received the other condition with the other colour. The 163 
resulting four groups were counterbalanced for age and sex. 164 
 165 
Coding and Analysis 166 
We used the recorded data from all 3 cameras for the analysis. First, we 167 
determined the relevant looking time intervals (the 7 seconds in which the 168 
experimenter looked at the target) by analysing the central camera data that focused 169 
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on the experimenter’s head. We then analysed the recordings of the left and right 170 
camera separately for all looks to the camera within the 7 seconds per trial in which 171 
the experimenter looked towards the camera. Looks were coded as “camera look” 172 
when the chimpanzee lined up his or her eyes with a camera for at least 0.33 s (8 173 
video frames). We differentiated the camera looks depending on whether the subject 174 
looked at the same camera as the experimenter (“correct look”), or at the other one 175 
(“incorrect look”). As subjects rarely looked to the cameras more than once within a 176 
7-s trial, we coded presence or absence of at least one correct/incorrect look per trial 177 
and analysed the proportion of trials with correct and incorrect looking for each 178 
individual. In trials in which the subject’s eyes were not aligned with the camera (or 179 
in which subjects only glanced at the camera for less than 0.33 seconds), no correct or 180 
incorrect looks were coded.  181 
For a better comparison to Meltzoff and Brooks’ (2008) between-subjects 182 
study with infants (who received only 4 trials each), we additionally analysed only the 183 
first 4 trials of each subject’s first session (resulting in a between-subject analysis of 184 
our originally within-subject data). Following Meltzoff and Brooks (2008), we scored 185 
the subject's first target look for each trial as either a correct look (+1) or an incorrect 186 
look (−1). If infants did not look at either target during the 7-s trial, they received a 187 
score of 0. We then calculated a looking score for each subject as the sum of correct 188 
looks, incorrect looks, and nonlooks (as it is routinely done in gaze-following studies 189 
with children, e.g., Butler, Caron & Brooks 2000; Dunphy-Lelii & Wellman 2004). 190 
Thus, the possible range for the looking scores across the first four trials varied from 191 
−4 to + 4.  192 
An independent observer coded a randomly selected 20% of the sessions. He 193 
was naïve to all test parameters. Interobserver agreement was assessed by Spearman’s 194 
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rho and was good for both the number of correct (rho = 0.78, P < 0.01) and incorrect 195 
looks (rho = 0.89, P < 0.01). 196 
 197 
Results 198 
The different experiences with the visual properties of the mask 199 
(opaque/transparent) did not affect the chimpanzees’ gaze-following behaviour 200 
towards the experimenter wearing that mask (repeated-measures ANOVA with 201 
condition, order and sex as between-subject factors: F1, 21 = 0.012, P = 0.913, η
2
 = 202 
0.001). In both conditions, chimpanzees looked at the correct camera in about 60% of 203 
the trials, whereas they looked at the incorrect camera in about 33% of the trials (Fig. 204 
3). 205 
We used a one-way ANOVA to assess the chimpanzees’ looking scores in 206 
their first 4 trials. Chimpanzees’ looking scores did not differ between the opaque and 207 
the screen condition, F1, 23 = 1.03; P = 0.32, although on average they looked less 208 
often to the target in the opaque condition (M = 1.00, 95% CI [-0.05, 2.05]) compared 209 
to the screen condition (M = 1.69, 95% CI [0.63, 2.75]). Overall, chimpanzees’ 210 
looking scores were higher than infants’ looking scores in both conditions (Infants: 211 
opaque condition: M  = 0.12±1.15; screen condition: M  = 1.04±1.37; Meltzoff & 212 




In this study, we adapted a study recently conducted with 18-month-old 217 
infants (Meltzoff & Brooks 2008) to chimpanzees to test their mentalising abilities. 218 
We did not observe any difference in chimpanzees’ gaze-following behaviour towards 219 
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an experimenter who was wearing a mask depending on whether they had 220 
experienced that the mask was opaque or transparent. We conclude that there is no 221 
evidence that chimpanzees in this study used their own visual experience to infer what 222 
another can see. In contrast, 18-month old infants followed the gaze of a blindfolded 223 
experimenter more when they had experienced that one could see through the 224 
blindfolds, compared to having experienced that they were opaque (Meltzoff & 225 
Brooks 2008). 226 
This difference in the results of chimpanzees and infants could be due to a 227 
methodological difference - we used masks instead of blindfolds. However, as the 228 
masks covered the whole face instead of just the eyes, this should have made the 229 
manipulation more obvious, not less. 230 
Gaze following could also have a different ecological significance for 231 
chimpanzees and children. Following another’s gaze in the rainforest as quickly as 232 
possible might be a highly adaptive response with little energetic costs. The behaviour 233 
might be more automatic and quick in chimpanzees than in humans, which could 234 
render it unsuitable to capture higher cognitive processes like the computation of 235 
another’s perspective. In our study, the subjects’ costs to follow the experimenter’s 236 
gaze were particularly low as they did not have to switch position to see the gaze 237 
target. This is reflected by the relatively high rates of gaze-following (about 60% of 238 
trials) that chimpanzees in our study showed despite the opaque face mask in front of 239 
the experimenter’s eyes. A study by Okamoto-Barth, Call & Tomasello (2007) 240 
measured great apes’ gaze-following behaviour towards an experimenter who was 241 
either looking through a window or at an opaque barrier (in 50 cm distance from the 242 
experimenter’s face). Chimpanzees followed the experimenter’s gaze to the target 243 
object in the window condition more (about 60%) than in the opaque condition (about 244 
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30%). Chimpanzees in our study hence treated the face mask more like a window than 245 
an opaque barrier, but did so independent of condition. One reason for this might be 246 
that our subjects face more ecological challenges (e.g., snakes, more food 247 
competition) than the zoo animals in the study by Okamoto-Barth, Call & Tomasello 248 
(2007), and they might thus be more sensitive to gaze. It could also be that a flat 249 
barrier close to one’s face is rather rare and its effect less often experienced in 250 
everyday life (and thus more likely not be taken into account) than gaze-obscuring 251 
obstacles in some distance of another individuals’ eyes. Overall, our results also 252 
support previous findings that chimpanzees are more sensitive to the role of head 253 
movements when following gaze compared to the role of the eyes (see Tomasello, 254 
Hare, Lehmann & Call 2007). 255 
Several studies have shown that chimpanzees take into account the geometric 256 
constellation of the looker and the object (Okamoto-Barth, Call & Tomasello 2007; 257 
Tomasello et al. 1999) and that adult, but not infant chimpanzees habituate when 258 
confronted with an experimenter who repeatedly looks towards nothing (Tomasello, 259 
Hare & Fogleman 2001). These results suggest that there is at least some degree of 260 
flexibility in chimpanzees’ gaze-following behaviour.  261 
 262 
EXPERIMENT 2 263 
In a second study, we used a competitive game to test the same question as in 264 
experiment 1, since competitive contexts have been quite successful in uncovering 265 
cognitive skills of chimpanzees (Hare & Tomasello 2004). Our set-up and procedure 266 
was inspired by a study from Melis, Call, and Tomasello (2006). We first established 267 
a competitive context by taking away food that the chimpanzee was trying to obtain 268 
and that the experimenter could see. In the subsequent test phase, the experimenter sat 269 
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opposite the chimpanzee with food in boxes to her left and right side. The boxes had 270 
different lid types: opaque, transparent or screen. The opaque and the transparent lids 271 
did not change their visual properties between their opened and their closed position. 272 
In contrast, subjects could see through the screen in its open position, but not when it 273 
was closed (the experimenter could, from her perspective, see through the screen in 274 
both its open and its closed position). Subjects were first familiarised with the visual 275 
properties of the lids; then the lids were closed and the subject could choose to steal 276 
food from one of the two boxes – opaque vs. transparent box (transparent condition) 277 
or opaque vs. screen box (screen condition). In a nonsocial control, we tested 278 
chimpanzees’ general preference to reach into the opaque box (compared to a 279 
transparent box), independent of the presence of a human competitor.  280 
Melis et al.’s procedure was basically the same, but with tunnels instead of 281 
boxes, and only two different tunnel types: opaque vs. transparent. The subject could 282 
then reach the food either through an opaque tunnel that hid her approaching hand, or 283 
through a transparent tunnel that did not prevent the experimenter from observing the 284 
reach. Subjects had a significant preference for reaching through the opaque tunnel, 285 
but such preference disappeared in a nonsocial control. While our transparent 286 
condition basically replicated Melis et al.’s experiment, the screen condition was the 287 
key to test chimpanzees’ mentalising abilities. We hypothesised that if subjects were 288 
able to use their experience with the lid properties to infer what the experimenter sees, 289 
they would prefer to steal from the opaque box, in which their hand was hidden from 290 
the experimenter’s view. They would not show such a preference when the human 291 
competitor was absent. 292 
 293 
Methods 294 
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Subjects 295 
Subjects were 19 semi-free ranging chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) at the 296 
Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Lake Victoria, Uganda 297 
(www.ngambaisland.org) (9 females, 10 males; age range 8 – 17 years, M = 14.3 298 
years). All but one young male (Rambo, 8 years) had participated in experiment 1 299 
before. All except one male (Kisembo, 14 years) passed the criterion that ensured that 300 
they understood the competitive nature of the game, such that 18 chimpanzees 301 
proceeded to the test. Subjects were fed according to their regular diet and were never 302 
food or water deprived. 303 
 304 
Apparatus 305 
The experimenter sat opposite the subject, 50 cm from the enclosure (Fig. 4). 306 
The bars between the experimenter and the subject were occluded (60 cm high, 100 307 
cm wide).  308 
There were two boxes to the experimenter’s left and right side (40x13 cm, 25 309 
cm high on subject’s side; 65 cm apart from each other). Two sliding food trays could 310 
be inserted in the boxes and moved away from or closer to the subject by a handle 311 
bar. The subject could reach the food by sliding up a transparent trap door (10x8 cm) 312 
at the box side facing her and then reaching through a hole into the box (6.5 cm 313 
diameter). The boxes had exchangeable lids, so that they could either be transparent, 314 
opaque or covered with four layers of black fly screen. To maximise the similarity in 315 
surface structure between the opaque and the screen lid, we fixed a layer of fly screen 316 
on the opaque lid. The lids could be brought into a stable open position (40 degrees 317 
above horizontal), such that the subject would have a good view of the visual 318 
properties of the lids, in particular to experience the screen as see-through. When the 319 
EXPERIENCE PROJECTION IN CHIMPANZEES  14 
 
lids were closed, the subjects could still see through the transparent lid, and could not 320 
see through the opaque lid. However, the screen lid changed its apparent properties: 321 
the subject could now not see through it any more (see Fig. 5, for pictures). In 322 
contrast, the experimenter was still able to see through the screen from her 323 
perspective. 324 
Procedure and Design 325 
Each subject first had to pass a criterion training and, if successful, received 326 
three conditions in randomised order: the nonsocial control, the transparent and the 327 
screen condition. Subjects received each condition in two consecutive sessions with 328 
12 trials each, summing up to 24 trials per condition and 72 trials in total. 329 
Training. To familiarise subjects with the competitive nature of the task, 330 
subjects learnt that the experimenter would retrieve the food if she could see the 331 
subject reaching for it. The experimenter sat opposite the subject, with the two boxes 332 
to her left and right side. Both box lids were transparent and, at the beginning of each 333 
session, open. To demonstrate the transparency of the lids, the experimenter showed 334 
the subject 5 peanuts through each of the lids, starting on her right side and then 335 
taking turns. Next, the experimenter closed the lids. The trial started with the 336 
experimenter baiting the boxes, with the food out of reach of the subject. She centered 337 
the subject by placing some peanuts between the boxes, 160 cm above the ground. 338 
While the subject was climbing up to get the peanuts, the experimenter pushed the 339 
food towards the trap doors and turned with her head and body towards one of the 340 
boxes (left and right side counterbalanced within a session, with the constraint that the 341 
orientation could not be the same in more than two consecutive trials), so she could 342 
see the food item she was oriented towards, but not the other. When the subject 343 
climbed back down, she could see both food items through the transparent trap doors. 344 
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However, when the subject tried to grab the food item that the experimenter was 345 
looking at, the experimenter pulled it back. When the subject tried to grab the other 346 
piece, she was allowed to obtain it. After the subject had made a decision, both trays 347 
were pulled back, and the next trial started. Each session included 12 trials. Subjects 348 
had to choose the correct side in at least 10 out of 12 trials in two consecutive sessions 349 
to proceed to the test. If they did not succeed within 10 sessions, they were dropped 350 
from the study. 351 
Test phase. Each test session started with 6 warm-up trials as in the training. 352 
They served to ensure the motivation of the subject on the testing day. The subjects 353 
proceeded to the actual test trials only if they chose the correct side in at least 5 out of 354 
6 warm-up trials (only two subjects failed and successfully restarted their session on 355 
the following day). Each test trial started with opening the lids, and demonstrating the 356 
lid properties that differed between the sides (transparent/opaque/screen) to the 357 
subject by showing her a peanut, moving it behind the lid and back to the center. The 358 
peanut was then given to the subject. Two peanuts were presented on each side, 359 
always starting with the right side and then taking turns. Then the lids were closed 360 
and the trays baited. The experimenter centered the subject as in the training. While 361 
the subject was climbing up to get the peanuts, the experimenter pushed the food 362 
towards the trap doors. She remained with her upper body and head centered, so that 363 
she could observe both boxes. When the subject tried to reach for the food underneath 364 
the transparent or the screen lid, the experimenter could see her hand and pulled back 365 
the food. If the subject chose the opaque side, on which her hand was hidden from the 366 
experimenter’s view, she was allowed to take it. Note that the bars between the 367 
chimpanzee and the experimenter were occluded up to a height of 60 cm, so that the 368 
subject could hide her approach from the experimenter. The three conditions differed 369 
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in the following way: 370 
Transparent. One lid was opaque, the other transparent. 371 
Screen. One lid was opaque, the other a fly screen. Subjects could learn about 372 
the see-through properties of the screen while the lids were open. As soon as the lids 373 
were closed, both sides looked opaque to the subject, while the experimenter could 374 
still see through the screen. To help the subjects discriminate between the two closed 375 
lids, on of them had a green frame (whether the green frame was attached to the 376 
opaque or the screen lid was counterbalanced between subjects). 377 
Control. To check for a general preference to choose the food underneath the 378 
opaque lid, we administered a nonsocial control. Everything was as in the transparent 379 
condition, with the only difference that the experimenter left the room after pushing 380 
the food towards the subject. The subject could then choose her preferred side 381 
independent of the presence of the human competitor. The experimenter returned after 382 
10 seconds. If the subject was quick enough, she could get both food items.  383 
We guarded against potential cueing by having the experimenter keep her 384 
body centered, her hands in her lap and look down in the middle between the boxes 385 
when the subject was approaching to choose. The subject could not see the 386 
experimenter’s eyes, and the experimenter could not see the subject’s body when it 387 
was close to the barrier. 388 
 389 
Coding and Analysis 390 
All trials were recorded by two cameras that focused on the boxes. For each 391 
trial, we coded which box the subject chose first by lifting the trap door 392 
(opaque/transparent/screen). An independent observer, naïve to all test parameters, 393 
coded a randomly selected 20% of the sessions. Interobserver agreement was 394 
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excellent (Cohen's kappa = 0.99, P < 0.001). We ran a logistic regression in the R 395 
Statistical Computing Environment, using the glm function (with a binomial link 396 
function) in the lme4 package. We included trial number and order group as 397 
covariates, and we included condition as a factor. 398 
 399 
Results 400 
Subjects passed the training on average after 6 sessions (72 trials) (95% 401 
Confidence Interval (CI) [5.21, 6.90], range 4-10 sessions). Only one male 402 
chimpanzee (14 years old) did not reach the criterion after 10 sessions (120 trials) and 403 
did not proceed to the test phase.  404 
In the test, subjects selected the opaque box more frequently in the screen and 405 
transparent conditions than in the control condition (Fig. 6). Our primary analysis (see 406 
Table 1) included the control condition as the reference level of the Condition factor 407 
(which includes three levels: control, screen, and transparent).  This models how 408 
behavior changes by moving from the control condition (i.e., the reference level) to 409 
the screen and transparent conditions.  Results show that the estimates for the screen 410 
and the transparent condition were both positive, indicating that animals are more 411 
likely to choose the opaque box in both of these conditions than they are likely to 412 
choose the opaque box in the control condition. This difference is significant for both 413 
screen and transparent conditions, as the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates 414 
do not include zero, and the p-values for the for both were less than .05 (transparent-415 
control: P = 0.04; screen-control: P = 0.01). To explore the difference between the 416 
screen and the transparent condition, we used the same model but re-leveled the 417 
Condition factor so that screen was now the reference level (see Table A1). Now, 418 
examining the estimate for the transparent condition tells us whether animals are more 419 
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likely to choose the opaque box in the transparent condition than in the screen 420 
condition. The results show that there is not a substantial difference between the 421 
screen and transparent conditions because the estimate for the transparent condition is 422 
small, the 95% confidence interval includes zero, and the p-value is greater than 423 
.05 (P= 0.63). 424 
We were also interested in whether chimpanzees’ choices were different from 425 
chance. We conducted one-sample t-tests and found that chimpanzees’ choice of the 426 
opaque box was significantly different above chance in the transparent (t17 = 2.58, P = 427 
0.020) and in the screen condition (t17 = 2.28, P = 0.036), but not in the control (t17 = 428 
0.940, P = 0.36).  429 
When looking at individual performances, six (out of 18) subjects performed 430 
(non-significantly) above chance (50% choice of opaque box) in both the transparent 431 
and the screen condition, four subjects performed above chance in the transparent, but 432 
not in the screen condition, and four subjects performed above chance in the screen, 433 
but not in the transparent condition.  434 
To assess learning over the course of testing, we compared each subject’s 435 
performance in the first and second session of the transparent and the screen condition 436 
to each other (Fig. A1), and in the first and last trial in these conditions (in the control, 437 
both lid types were rewarded, so there was no learning opportunity). We did not 438 
observe a change in subject’s choices of the opaque box between first and second 439 
session (paired-samples t-tests; transparent: t17 = -1.25, P = 0.23; screen: t17 = 0.59, P 440 
= 0.56) or between first and last trial within condition (related-samples McNemar 441 
Test; transparent: P = 0.77; screen: P = 1.0). As the choice of the opaque box was 442 
rewarded in the experimental conditions, we were interested in possible carry-over 443 
effects to the control. We thus conducted a between-subjects one-way ANOVA to 444 
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compare the effect of zero, one or two preceding experimental conditions on the 445 
number of choices of the opaque box in the control. Without any previous experience, 446 
subjects’ choice was close to chance with M = 52.0% (95% CI [45.5, 58.7]), and this 447 
did not change significantly in control conditions after one or two preceding 448 
experimental conditions; F(2, 15) = 1.18, P = 0.33 (control second: M = 46.5% (95% 449 
CI [37.2, 55.9]); control last: M = 46.5% (95% CI [40.1, 53.0]).  450 
 451 
Discussion 452 
In this study, chimpanzees were allowed to steal food from an experimenter if 453 
the experimenter could not see the stealing attempt. We found that chimpanzees 454 
preferred to steal food from an opaque box when choosing either between an opaque 455 
and a transparent box (transparent condition) or between an opaque box and a box 456 
with a screen lid, that looked opaque from their, but not from the experimenter’s 457 
perspective, but that they had experienced to be see-through earlier from a different 458 
perspective (screen condition). Interestingly, subjects performed above chance in both 459 
conditions, but not better in the (seemingly easier) transparent condition. In contrast, 460 
chimpanzees did not show a preference for the opaque box when choosing between 461 
opaque and transparent in a nonsocial control in which the experimenter was not 462 
present at the time of stealing.  463 
These results demonstrate that chimpanzees were able to use their own 464 
experience with the visual properties of the lids to later infer in which box their 465 
approaching hand would be hidden from the experimenter. Crucially, in the moment 466 
of choice in the screen condition, both box lids appeared opaque from their 467 
perspective (and both had a screen surface), but they had experienced earlier that one 468 
could see through the screen from a different angle, but not through the opaque lid.  469 
EXPERIENCE PROJECTION IN CHIMPANZEES  20 
 
The results of our study confirm previous results by Melis et al. (2006) and 470 
extend them in important ways. First, we confirmed that chimpanzees conceal visual 471 
information by preferring the obscured approach route to the food over the exposed 472 
route when a human competitor is present. Notably, this preference was small both in 473 
our study (choice rate of opaque box: M = 56%) and in Melis et al.’s study (M = 474 
57%), probably because our task is “at the limit of what chimpanzees are capable of” 475 
(Melis et al. 2006, p. 157). Chimpanzees did not maintain the same high level of 476 
performance in the test compared to the end of the training (at least 83% correct); this 477 
was probably due to the higher cognitive challenge in the test, in which subjects could 478 
not rely on the experimenter’s body orientation, but had to use their own experience 479 
with the visual properties of the lids, compared to the training (in which they could 480 
rely solely on the salient cue of the experimenter’s body orientation), resulting in an 481 
additional memory problem. On top of that, subjects did not get training with the 482 
exact test situation (while they received an average of 6 sessions of experience with 483 
the requirements in the training). However, together with previous results (Hare, Call 484 
& Tomasello 2006; Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007; Tomasello et al. 1999) these studies 485 
consistently support the view that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see 486 
in various situations, and that they can use this knowledge strategically in competitive 487 
or food begging contexts (see also Bräuer, Call & Tomasello 2005, 2007; Bulloch, 488 
Boysen & Furlong 2008; Hostetter, Cantero & Hopkins 2001; Hostetter, Russell, 489 
Freeman & Hopkins 2007; Tempelmann, Kaminski & Liebal 2011). 490 
Second, our study adds to previous studies by confronting subjects with a 491 
situation in which they can only successfully compete if they project their self-492 
experience with an object to the human competitor to predict what the other can see. 493 
This procedure bears the advantage that popular “lower-level” explanations for their 494 
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success do not apply here: behaviour reading or learned behavioural rules (e.g., Heyes 495 
1998; Penn & Povinelli 2007). We would like to address three prominent concerns.  496 
1. Subjects could have merely reacted to behavioural cues of the experimenter, e.g., 497 
her body orientation or her gaze.  498 
We can exclude this explanation as in the test, the experimenter’s body was 499 
oriented to the center between the boxes and her gaze direction was not visible to the 500 
subject as she looked down towards the box lids. 501 
2. Subjects could have learnt about the effect of the lid properties on the 502 
experimenter’s vision by observing her interacting with the lids.  503 
The experimenter treated all lid types in the same way. In addition, the lids were 504 
positioned such that the chimpanzee could never see the experimenter’s eyes through 505 
the transparent lid or the screen. However, the lid types were differentially rewarded – 506 
while subjects were allowed to steal from the box with the opaque lid, the 507 
experimenter retrieved the food from underneath the transparent or screen lid during a 508 
stealing attempt. Therefore, subjects could potentially learn to choose the opaque box 509 
in the course of the 24 trials of each experimental condition. However, we found no 510 
evidence of improvement over time. Subjects did not choose the opaque box more 511 
often in control conditions that were preceded by one or two experimental conditions, 512 
compared to naïve subjects’ choice behaviour in control conditions. Within 513 
conditions, we did not observe increased success rates in the second compared to the 514 
first session or in the first compared to the last trial. Thus, although subjects could 515 
have used e.g., the coloured frames as a learning cue, they did not improve over trials.  516 
3. Subjects could have formed rules from observing other individuals in their natural 517 
environment and infer the experimenter’s behaviour from these rules.  518 
For example, in a prominent set of studies (Hare, Call, Agnetta & Tomasello 519 
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2000; Hare, Call & Tomasello 2001) subdominant chimpanzees reliably avoided food 520 
that a dominant competitor could see or had seen in the past when competing with 521 
him about two food items. While most other explanations could be excluded, one 522 
potential lower-level explanation remained: In their every-day environment, subjects 523 
could have learnt rules about the contingencies of the eyes of a competitor and 524 
contested food, e.g., by imagining a line of sight between the competitor’s eyes and 525 
the food (“evil eyes hypothesis”, see Povinelli & Vonk 2004). For this objection to 526 
apply to our study, chimpanzees would need to have experienced others looking 527 
through screens and then act as if they could see; it is unlikely that the subjects in our 528 
study were ever exposed to such experiences as they live in a natural forest during the 529 
day and have no previous experience with experiments involving screens or others 530 
interacting with them. Moreover, in our study at the time of choice, the 531 
experimenter’s line of sight seemed obstructed by the box lids from the subject’s 532 
perspective for both the opaque and the screen lid. Only by projecting their 533 
experience of being able to see through the screen in the training phase, subjects could 534 
successfully avoid being caught stealing (see also Kaminski, Call & Tomasello 2008; 535 
Schmelz, Call & Tomasello 2011).  536 
However, we are aware of one additional alternative explanation for our 537 
results. Following up the evil eye hypothesis, one could object that chimpanzees 538 
imagined a line of sight between the experimenter’s eyes and the food, and imagined 539 
the screen in the right position such that it would not block this line. Similarly, the 540 
subjects could have learnt about the “psychological affordances” of the masks, such 541 
as “able to be seen through” and “unable to be seen through”, instead of projecting 542 
their visual experience to the competitor (see Meltzoff & Brooks 2008). The subject 543 
could then use its everyday experience to avoid the food item that is unobstructed 544 
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from the competitor’s view. This explanation might require them to imagine the 545 
screen from the experimenter’s perspective (as from their perspective, it is “unable to 546 
be seen through” at the moment of choice), thus forming a mental representation of an 547 
object that differs from their own. This skill, also known as level 2 perspective taking 548 
sensu Flavell and colleagues (Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell 1981; Masangkay, 549 
McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & Flavell 1974) correlates highly with 550 
classic mentalising skills such as false belief understanding and active deception in 551 
children (even when controlling for age and language development (Bigelow & 552 
Dugas 2009, Farrant, Fletcher & Maybery 2006). This suggests similar underlying 553 
mechanisms, in particular the ability to envision perspectives that counter one’s own.  554 
But even if subjects do not imagine the screen from the experimenter’s 555 
perspective, the task at least requires them to learn about the psychological 556 
affordances of the lids by learning how it affects themselves and applying it to others 557 
(see Meltzoff & Brooks 2008). 558 
 559 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 560 
We ran two studies that tested chimpanzees’ ability to project their visual 561 
experience with an object to a human to predict what she can see. While they failed to 562 
do so in a non-competitive gaze-following task (experiment 1), they were successful 563 
in a competitive context (experiment 2). In experiment 1, subjects first gained 564 
experience with an opaque or transparent (but opaque-looking) face mask. Then we 565 
measured their gaze-following behaviour towards a masked experimenter. 566 
Chimpanzees did not take into account the different visual properties of the mask 567 
while following the experimenter’s gaze. In contrast, Meltzoff and Brooks (2008) 568 
found in a highly similar study that 18-month-old infants followed the gaze of a 569 
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blindfolded experimenter more when they had experienced the blindfolds as see-570 
through rather than as opaque.  571 
In experiment 2, we tested the same question in a competitive paradigm. 572 
Subjects could steal food from an experimenter by reaching into one of two boxes. If 573 
the experimenter saw the stealing attempt, she retrieved the food. In the key 574 
condition, both box lids seemed opaque from the subject’s perspective; however, they 575 
had experienced that from a different point of view, one of the lids (the screen) was 576 
see-through, while the other really was opaque. Chimpanzees preferred to reach for 577 
the food under the truly opaque lid, in which their approach was hidden from the 578 
experimenter, and avoided the screen lid through which the experimenter could see. 579 
In a nonsocial control condition, they did not show such a preference. 580 
We argue that this study fulfils the requirements that skeptics propose to 581 
validly test mentalising skills in nonhuman primates (the ‘goggles experiment’, e.g., 582 
Heyes 1998; Shettleworth 2010). First, the cue on which the inference to the mental 583 
state was made was arbitrary – in the test situation, chimpanzees could discriminate 584 
between the box lids only by the frame colour or their location. Second, subjects did 585 
not have exposure to (human or non-human) others behaving in association with that 586 
cue, excluding the possibility of associative learning or “learnt behavioural rules” 587 
(and we did not find any learning effect over trials). And third, although both box lids 588 
looked opaque in the moment of choice, chimpanzees discriminated between their 589 
visual properties based on their previous self-experience, and used this knowledge 590 
appropriately to anticipate what the human competitor would be able to see. Note, 591 
however, that not all researchers accept the goggles experiment as a valid test of 592 
mental state attribution (e.g., Csibra 1998; Lurz 2009; Perner 2010). Their key point is 593 
that we do not know whether chimpanzees (and other non-human animals) experience 594 
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“seeing” as a mental state themselves, or whether they reason about “seeing” (even 595 
their own experience of it) non-mentalistically – for instance, by experiencing seeing 596 
as having an unobstructed line of sight on an object. Thus, even if we find that 597 
chimpanzees project their own experience to others, some authors argue that this does 598 
not necessarily indicate that they project mental states to others. As Csibra (1998) 599 
puts it: 600 
“Seeing is a mental concept if, and only if, it refers to an epistemic relation 601 
between a mind and an object/event that is established in a particular (visual) way; 602 
but it is not a mental concept when it refers only to the physical relations that may or 603 
may not give rise to the epistemic relation. Accordingly, demonstrating that animals 604 
can understand such a physical relation and can use it as a discriminatory cue to 605 
predict the usability of people’s behaviour is not sufficient evidence for applying 606 
mental concepts. What is needed in addition is to demonstrate that the animals 607 
conceive the result of seeing as a representational rather than a dispositional state.” 608 
(Csibra, 1998; p. 118) 609 
But if chimpanzees are able to project their self-experience to others (in 610 
whichever form), why did they not show differential gaze-following towards a 611 
masked experimenter, depending on whether they experienced the mask as opaque or 612 
transparent before (experiment 1) - in particular, as 18-month-old infants successfully 613 
do so (Meltzoff & Brooks 2008)? Several factors might account for this discrepancy. 614 
First, chimpanzees often show clearer outcomes in competitive situations, possibly 615 
due to their highly competitive environment in hierarchically organised groups (Hare 616 
& Tomasello 2004). In contrast, in the human world cooperation is a key feature for 617 
successful adaptation, and human infants have a natural tendency to cooperate from 618 
early on (Tomasello 2009). This difference in ecological demands might explain why 619 
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18-month old human infants succeeded in Meltzoff and Brooks’ (2008) study, while 620 
chimpanzees failed in our highly similar study.  621 
Second, whereas the gaze following required in experiment 1 is a quick and 622 
rather automatic response (although adult chimpanzees have demonstrated some 623 
flexibility in gaze following, e.g., they take into account the presence of barriers 624 
(Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007), and stop following the gaze of someone who repeatedly 625 
looks towards nothing (Tomasello et al. 2001), in experiment 2 chimpanzees had 626 
unlimited time to think about which box to choose. Although in humans, 627 
sociocognitive processes such as perspective taking have been proven to be fast and 628 
sometimes even involuntary (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley 629 
Scott 2010; Surtees & Apperly 2012), these processes might be computed slower in 630 
great apes, and thus be captured better with more explicit behavioural measures.  631 
Third, while subjects could use only the frame colour as a cue to the visual 632 
properties of the mask in experiment 1, they could use frame colour and/or location of 633 
the lid (left/right of the experimenter) as a cue in the second study. Obviously, the 634 
location of the rewarded lid varied randomly between the trials; however, in the 635 
experience phase of each trial, they could not only learn about the frame colour, but 636 
also about the location of the (truly) opaque lid. Several studies demonstrate that 637 
chimpanzees have difficulties with quickly associating arbitrary cues such as colour 638 
with the presence of food (e.g., Call 2006; Jarvik 1953, 1956), which might account 639 
for their indiscriminate gaze-following behaviour in experiment 1. Other studies show 640 
that chimpanzees prefer location to colour as a cue to find food (e.g., Haun, Call, 641 
Janzen & Levinson 2006; Tinklepaugh 1932; but see also Kanngiesser & Call 2010, 642 
for contradicting results). The additional informative spatial feature might thus have 643 
helped chimpanzees to choose the correct box in experiment 2.  644 
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After dozens of positive findings that show that chimpanzees understand what 645 
others see or hear (Bräuer et al. 2007; Hare et al. 2000; Melis et al. 2006), prefer 646 
(Schmelz, Call & Tomasello 2013), know (Hare et al. 2001; Kaminski et al. 2008), 647 
attend to (MacLean & Hare 2012), intend (Behne, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello 2005; 648 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello 2007; Call, Hare, Carpenter & Tomasello 649 
2004; Call & Tomasello 1998; Warneken & Tomasello 2006), and infer (Schmelz et 650 
al. 2011), this study provides additional evidence that chimpanzees possess 651 
mentalising capacities revealed by a different and powerful method. Because subjects 652 
used their self-experience to infer what the competitor saw, the current results might 653 
fit best with Meltzoff”s “Like Me” framework (2007). 654 
Overall, we thus agree with Whiten’s recent evaluation of the state of the art 655 
of the field (Whiten 2013): “Humans are not alone in computing how others see the 656 
world”. As the methodology of the current study is based on suggestions of skeptics 657 
in the field, it would seem to constitute especially powerful additional evidence for 658 
this proposal. 659 
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  838 
Table 1 Results of the General Linear Model determining whether trial number, 839 
condition order or condition influences chimpanzees’ choices of the opaque box 840 
 
Estimate Std. Error z value P 
 
(Intercept) 0.030 0.195 0.152 0.880 
 Trial Number 0.003 0.008 0.363 0.716 
 Condition Order -0.066 0.068 -0.958 0.338 
 Screen 0.354 0.137 2.587 0.010 **
 
Transparent 0.288 0.137 2.110 0.035 *
 
Significance codes: ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05 841 
 842 
 843 
Table A1 Results of the General Linear Model determining whether trial number, 844 
condition order or condition influences chimpanzees’ choices of the opaque box, with 845 
the screen condition as the reference level 846 
 
Estimate Std. Error z value p 
 
(Intercept) 0.038 0.196 1.957 0.050 
 
Trial Number 0.003 0.008 0.363 0.716 
 
Condition Order -0.066 0.068 -0.958 0.338 
 
Control -0.354 0.137 -2.587 0.010 **
 
Transparent -0.066 0.137 -0.480 0.631 
 
Significance codes: ‘**’ 0.01  847 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 848 
 849 
Fig. 1 Set-up of experiment 1. In the test phase, the chimpanzee was sitting opposite 850 
the experimenter who was wearing a face mask and orienting towards a 851 
colorful object underneath the camera that recorded the subject’s gaze-852 
following behaviour. 853 
Fig. 2 Pictures of the face masks for experiment 1 as an example of the chimpanzees’ 854 
experience in the training phase. On the left, the colorful toy on the black 855 
board is visible through the screen mask, whereas on the right, the toy is 856 
hidden behind the opaque mask.  857 
Fig. 3 Mean percentages of trials with at least one correct (grey bars) or one incorrect 858 
look (white bars) in the opaque and screen conditions. Error bars refer to 95% 859 
CI. 860 
Fig. 4 Set-up of experiment 2. (a) Apparatus with open lids from the experimenter’s 861 
perspective. (b) Training phase. The chimpanzee can see the peanuts through 862 
the screen lid on his left side, but not through the opaque lid on his right side. 863 
(c) Test phase. Both lids are closed and now appear opaque to the subject, 864 
whereas the experimenter can still see through the screen. The chimp can now 865 
decide to lift and reach through one of the trap doors to steal a banana piece. 866 
Note that the space between the chimpanzee and the experimenter was 867 
occluded up to a height of 60 cm (lower breast height of the experimenter; not 868 
depicted in the picture) such that the experimenter could not see which side 869 
the chimpanzee chose until observing the subject’s hand in one of the boxes.  870 
Fig. 5 Pictures of the box lids in the screen condition in their open (above) and their 871 
closed position (below) from the subjects’ perspective. The screen lid is on the 872 
left, the opaque lid on the right side. 873 
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Fig. 6 Mean percentages of trials with the choice of the opaque box across the three 874 
conditions. In the transparent condition, one lid was opaque, the other 875 
transparent. In the screen condition, one lid was a screen, the other opaque. 876 
The control was like the transparent condition, but without the experimenter’s 877 
presence at the time of choice. Error bars indicate 95% CI, ‘*’ indicates P < 878 
0.05, ‘**’ indicates P < 0.01. 879 
Fig. A1 Comparison of the chimpanzees’ choices of the opaque box in the first (white 880 
bars) and second session (grey bars) of the transparent and the screen 881 
condition in experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95% CI.  882 
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